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COMMENT
SACRED RAIN ARROW: HONORING THE NATIVE
AMERICAN HERITAGE OF THE STATES WHILE
BALANCING THE CITIZENS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Amelia Coates *
Abstract
Many states’ histories and traditions are steeped heavily in Native
American culture, which explains why tribal imagery and symbolism are
prevalent in official state paraphernalia such as license plates, flags, and
state seals. Problems arise for states using Native American artwork when a
citizen takes offense to the religious implications of Native American
depictions, and objects to having it displayed on any number of items. This
Comment will examine the likely outcome of cases involving
Establishment Clause and compelled speech claims arising from Native
American images and propose a solution for balancing the constitutional
rights of the citizens while still honoring the states’ rich Native American
heritage.
I. Introduction
States have used Native American imagery in their official state
paraphernalia for hundreds of years; in fact, some states used these
depictions when they were only colonies. King Charles I permitted a charter
to the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1629, which included the authority to
use a seal portraying an Indian holding an arrow downward to indicate
peace. 1 The current Massachusetts seal, although very different from its
original, depicts an Algonquin Native American clothed in moccasins and a
shirt, holding a bow in his right hand and an arrow in his left hand, pointed

* Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. The author would
like to extend a special thank you to Professor Joseph Thai, whose First Amendment course
provided context and inspiration for this comment. This piece would never have come to
fruition without your insightful comments and feedback during the research and writing
process.
1. The History of the Arms and Great Seal of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
WILLIAM FRANCIS GALVIN: SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., http://www.sec.
state.ma.us/pre/presea/sealhis.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
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downward. 2 This has been the Massachusetts official state seal since June 4,
1885, and the seal is also currently displayed on the Massachusetts state
flag. 3
The Florida state seal, also depicted on its state flag, shows a Native
American Seminole woman strewing flowers 4; the state flag of Kansas
features Indians hunting American Bison5; the Minnesota state flag and seal
have an image of an Indian riding on a horse 6; Oklahoma’s flag and seal
exhibits an Osage warrior’s shield and honors more than sixty Native
American groups. 7 More subtle references to Native American culture on
state memorabilia include an Indian ear of corn on Delaware’s state flag
and seal 8, the red border of Wyoming’s state flag which represents the
Indians who occupied the land long before the settlers came 9, and the
simple design of New Mexico’s state flag displaying the sun symbol of the
Zia people. 10
Two states feature Native American imagery on their official state
license plates: New Mexico and Oklahoma. New Mexico’s license plate
repeats the same image depicted on its state flag, the Zia sun symbol. 11 The
Oklahoma license plate, which used to display the same buffalo shield
image used on the state flag and seal, now features the image of deceased

2. Id.; The Massachusetts State Flag, NETSTATE, http://www.netstate.com/states/symb/
flags/ma_flag.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
3. The Massachusetts State Flag, supra note 2.
4. The Florida State Flag, NETSTATE, http://www.netstate.com/states/symb/flags/fl_
flag.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
5. The Kansas State Flag, NETSTATE, http://www.netstate.com/states/symb/flags/ks_
flag.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
6. The Minnesota State Flag, NETSTATE, http://www.netstate.com/states/symb/flags/
mn_flag.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
7. The Oklahoma State Flag, NETSTATE, http://www.netstate.com/states/symb/flags/
ok_flag.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013); The Great Seal of Oklahoma, NETSTATE, http://
www.netstate.com/states/symb/seals/ok_seal.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
8. The Delaware State Flag, NETSTATE, http://www.netstate.com/states/symb/flags/
de_flag.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013); The Great Seal of Delaware, NETSTATE, http://
www.netstate.com/states/symb/seals/de_seal.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
9. The Wyoming State Flag, NETSTATE, http://www.netstate.com/states/symb/flags/
wy_flag.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
10. The Zia Sun Symbol, N.M. OFFICE OF THE STATE HISTORIAN, http://newmexico
history.org/multimedia/videos/the-zia-sun-symbol (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
11. New Mexico License Plates, 1969-Present, INDEX OF U.S. LICENSE P LATE PAGES,
http://www.15q.net/nm.html (last modified Oct. 10, 2011).
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artist Allan Houser’s sculpture Sacred Rain Arrow. 12 Houser, born in
Oklahoma, was of Chiricahua Apache descent, which frequented the
subjects of his artwork. 13 The inspiration for Sacred Rain Arrow occurred
in Houser’s youth when an older Chiricahua Apache showed Houser a
drawing of a young Apache warrior aiming an arrow towards the sky while
kneeling on the ground.14 The story that inspired the drawing had been told
for generations, in which the young warrior had been sent to a medicine
man who blessed his bow and arrows. 15 After having his bow and arrows
blessed, the warrior knelt down and shot his arrow into the heavens, hoping
to carry the prayer for rain to the Spirit World. 16
One of the few sculptures of Houser’s piece Sacred Rain Arrow has
resided at the Thomas Gilcrease Museum in Tulsa, Oklahoma, for more
than two decades. 17 The piece is also displayed at the Smithsonian, and was
even used as the centerpiece of the Olympic Village during the 2002
Olympic Winter Games.18 In the spring of 2008, Sacred Rain Arrow was
chosen from five finalists to be displayed on the official Oklahoma license
plate, which had featured the Osage shield artwork since 1993. 19 The other
finalists Sacred Rain Arrow beat out for the coveted spot included western
images, such as a portrayal of Will Rogers, and other Native American
artwork. 20 Now roughly 3.2 million vehicles in Oklahoma bear the image
on their license plates.21
Although the license plate received an award for Automobile License
Plate Collectors Association’s best plate of the year in 2009, the new
12. Oklahoma License Plates, 1969-Present, INDEX OF U.S. LICENSE PLATE PAGES,
http://www.15q.net/ok.html (last modified Oct. 3, 2011); Greg Horton, ‘Rain God’
Oklahoma License Plate: Pastor Keith Cressman Lawsuit Approved by 10th Circuit Court of
Appeals, HUFFINGTON POST (Jun. 17, 2013, 3:02 PM EDT), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/06/17/pastor-suit-against-oklahoma-license-plate-ok_n_3455129.html.
13. Kelsy Taylor, Sacred Rain Arrow Statue Marks History, GTR NEWSPAPERS,
http://www.gtrnews.com/greater-tulsa-reporter/4126/sacred-rain-arrow-statue-marks-history
(last updated Aug. 20, 2009).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Allan Houser (Haozous): Sacred Rain Arrow, COLO. SPRINGS FINE ARTS CENTER,
http://www.csfineartscenter.org/collection-spotlight/houser-sacred.asp (last visited Sept. 28,
2013); Taylor, supra note 13.
17. Taylor, supra note 13.
18. Allan Houser (Haozous): Sacred Rain Arrow, supra note 16; Taylor, supra note 13.
19. Taylor, supra note 13.
20. New Oklahoma License Plates, SKYSCRAPERCITY, http://www.skyscrapercity.com/
showthread.php?t=566007 (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
21. Taylor, supra note 13.
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Sacred Rain Arrow artwork was not introduced without controversy. 22 On
an article posted to review the new license plate, readers made online
comments calling the plate “racist” for only representing Native Americans,
while others were proud of the image, which represents the Native
American influence in Oklahoman culture.23 One Oklahoman, Keith
Cressman, was offended by the new license plate design for constitutional
reasons.
Cressman filed suit November 2, 2011, against Oklahoma state officials
alleging that Oklahoma forced Cressman to speak in violation of his First
Amendment rights by requiring him to display the Sacred Rain Arrow
image on his license plate.24 The district court dismissed Cressman’s
complaint, and on June 12, 2013, the Tenth Circuit reinstated his claim. 25
The Tenth Circuit held that Cressman’s complaint put forth a plausible
compelled speech claim because Cressman alleged adequate facts show that
the Native American image expresses a particularized message that others
are likely to understand, and to which Cressman opposes. 26 Upon remand to
the district court, Cressman’s case was unsuccessful on the basis that a
reasonable observer would not interpret the image to be transmitting a
religious message. 27
Although other suits have been brought protesting depictions on license
plates construed as religious, 28 Cressman’s case is the first to protest against
the Native American religious implications of imagery on any official state
paraphernalia. This case could be the beginning of similar cases filed by
those offended by the religious attributes of Native American culture on
state memorabilia. Cressman’s case could have a widespread effect on the
future possibility of states using tribal artwork in their official state
memorabilia, because so many states use imagery similar to Sacred Rain
Arrow.
This Comment examines the possibility of lawsuits closely resembling
Cressman’s, the legal claims likely to support the suits, and how the courts
should analyze these types of cases. Part II explains the two legal actions
22. Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1158 (10th Cir. 2013).
23. New Oklahoma License Plate, ABOUT.COM, http://okc.about.com/b/2008/08/19/newoklahoma-license-plate.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
24. Cressman, 719 F.3d 1139.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Cressman v. Thompson, No. CIV-11-1290-HE, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 14,
2014).
28. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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that affronted citizens will most likely pursue, the Establishment Clause and
compelled speech doctrine. Part III analyzes the likely outcome of these
cases, and Part IV offers a balancing approach for courts to use in order to
successfully weigh the First Amendment rights of citizens against the
interests of the states in preserving their rich Native American culture.
II. History of the Establishment Clause and Compelled Speech Doctrine
The text of the First Amendment provides: “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.” 29 Out of this text have risen two constitutional
limitations on the government: the Establishment Clause and the compelled
speech doctrine, which are the two doctrines most likely to be used by
citizens wanting to assert claims against their respective states for being
forced to display Native American depictions in violation of their religious
beliefs on various state memorabilia.
A. Development of the Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
Before incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Establishment
Clause was rarely litigated in the Supreme Court. 30 The Supreme Court
itself has referred to the First Amendment religion text as “opaque.” 31
Years after incorporation, the Court used a straightforward, two-prong test
that asked first whether the action by the government had a religious
purpose, and second if the action had a religious effect.32 The Supreme
Court developed the three-part Lemon test in 1971. 33
29. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30. Frank J. Ducoat, Inconsistent Guideposts: Van Orden, McCreary County, and the
Continuing Need for a Single and Predictable Establishment Clause Test, RUTGERS J.L. &
RELIGION, 3 (Spring 2007), http://lawandreligion.com/sites/lawandreligion.com/files/Ducoat.
pdf (volume 8, part 2).
31. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
32. Id.
33. Id. The Supreme Court uses three different approaches to Establishment Clause
cases: strict separation, neutrality, or accommodation & equality. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1236-37, 1240 (4th ed. 2011). The strict separation approach is
described by Thomas Jefferson’s metaphor of a wall separating church and state. Id. at 1236.
This is unattainable, because it would result in an impossible standard, which would not
allow the government to provide routine services such as police or fire assistance to the
church. Id. at 1237. The neutrality approach mandates the government to be neutral to
religion, and not favor one religion over another or secularism over religion. Id. The
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In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the subjects of constitutional debate were a
Rhode Island state statute that provided a salary supplement for nonpublic
schoolteachers, and a Pennsylvania state statute that provided
reimbursement for salaries, textbooks, and other materials for certain
secular subjects in nonpublic schools.34 The Court stated that the
Establishment Clause was meant to give protection from three main evils:
“sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity.” 35 In order to fulfill its duty to protect the public from
these evils, the Court’s test asked first, if the state has a “secular legislative
purpose”; second, if its “principal or primary effect [n]either advances nor
inhibits religion”; and last, whether the statute fosters “an excessive
government entanglement with religion.”36
The Court held the Rhode Island statute failed the Lemon test because by
providing the salary supplements to nonpublic teachers, the government
entangled itself with religion; the Court came to this conclusion by
reasoning that a dedicated religious teacher would have difficulty
maintaining religious neutrality. 37 The lines between the secular and
religious classes were very blurred, and even with the best of intentions a
teacher would find it difficult to maintain a complete separation between
secular teaching and religious doctrine.38 The Pennsylvania statute failed
the Lemon test because the government had to monitor the courses given
compensation and establish the cost between secular and religious
educations, which entangled the state with religion. 39 The statute also
allowed state financial aid to go directly to religious schools, which caused
further entanglement. 40
Although Lemon has perhaps been considered the principal
Establishment Clause test, three years after the case was decided the
Supreme Court held that the factors in Lemon were “no more than helpful
“symbolic endorsement” test developed in Van Orden v. Perry measures the neutrality of the
government. Id. at 1237, 1240. Finally, the accommodation or equality approach
acknowledges the importance of religion in society, and would have religion accommodated
in the government. Id. at 1240. The only way the establishment clause would be violated
under this approach would be if the government established a church, required religious
participation, or favored one religion over another. Id. at 1242.
34. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607, 609.
35. Id. at 612.
36. Id. at 612-13.
37. Id. at 602, 618.
38. Id. at 618-19.
39. Id. at 621.
40. Id.
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signposts.” 41 In Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice O’Connor proposed the
"endorsement test" in her concurrence, which incorporates the same prongs
from the Lemon test but interprets them in a different light.42 The
endorsement test essentially combines the Lemon purpose and effect prong
to inquire into whether the government’s purpose is to endorse or
disapprove of religion, and whether the effect, notwithstanding purpose, is
to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval as understood by the
reasonable observer. 43 Justice O’Connor explained endorsement as
“send[ing] a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community . . . [d]isapproval sends the opposite message.” 44 Justice
O’Connor also emphasized, “it is only practices having that effect [of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion], whether intentionally
or unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or public
perception, to status in the political community.” 45
The Court applied the endorsement test in County of Allegheny v. ACLU
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, in which the subjects of debate were the
display of a crèche in the county courthouse and an eighteen foot Chanukah
menorah placed next to a forty-five foot Christmas tree by the entrance to
the City-County Building in Pittsburgh; a sign was displayed in front of the
tree and menorah stating “Salute to Liberty.” 46 The Court stated that
endorsement is not self-defining, but “derives its meaning from other words
that this Court has found useful over the years in interpreting the
Establishment Clause.” 47 The Supreme Court held that because the crèche
was displayed singularly in a prominent area of the building with nothing to
detract from its religious message, it would be seen as an “unmistakable
message that [the city] supports and promotes the Christian praise to God
that is the creche’s religious message.” 48
The Court acknowledged that the menorah was a closer constitutional
question, but stated the menorah had a religious and secular meaning, and
41. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
42. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
43. Id. at 690; Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
620 (1989).
44. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
45. Id. at 692.
46. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578, 581-82, 587.
47. Id. at 593.
48. Id. at 600.
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when considering the setting the effect was an “overall holiday setting.” 49
However, the Court recognized endorsing two religions has the same
constitutional effect as endorsing one, and questioned whether the
integrated display of the tree, menorah, and the sign had the effect of
endorsing the Christian and Jewish faiths, or whether it would simply be
seen as a secular celebration of the holiday season.50 The Supreme Court
held that because the Christmas tree was not a religious symbol, and
because the city did not have an emblem with lesser religious implications
to represent the Chanukah holiday (whose religious effect was further
diluted by the sign) the display did not fail the endorsement test. 51
The two most recent Establishment Clause cases both decided by the
Supreme Court on June 27, 2005, albeit very differently, are Van Orden v.
Perry and McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of
Kentucky. Each case considered whether displays of the Ten
Commandments on government property violated the Establishment
Clause. 52 The Supreme Court is likely to apply these cases to those
concerning Native American symbolism in official state memorabilia
because of the similarities. Native American artwork and images displayed
on state items often have religious meanings or associations like the Ten
Commandments displayed on government property have religious
meanings or associations.
In Van Orden v. Perry, a plurality opinion, a monument inscribed with
the Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds, which had
been in place for more than forty years, fell within the limitations of the
Establishment Clause.53 Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas in finding that to apply the Lemon test would
be illogical, and its analysis was “driven both by the nature of the
monument and by our Nation’s history.” 54 The four justices also stated that
in applying the Establishment Clause its cases point in two directions: one
face looks toward the powerful role played by religion and religious
traditions throughout the history of the Nation, and the other face considers

49. Id. at 613-14.
50. Id. at 616.
51. Id. at 616-18.
52. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545
U.S. 677 (2005).
53. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 677, 679.
54. Id. at 686.
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the fundamental assumption that governmental intervention in religious
matters can cause a danger to religious freedom. 55
In their analysis of Van Orden, the justices acknowledged that although
the Court has sometimes used Lemon as the governing test in Establishment
Clause cases, not all the justices agree on the test, and in some cases the
Court has simply not applied Lemon at all, or applied the Lemon test after
deciding a challenged practice was unconstitutional under a different
Establishment Clause test. 56 The decision not to impose the Lemon test in
Van Orden was made because of the monument’s passive nature, and the
justices instead reflected on the role of religion in the United States’
history, starting with George Washington’s issuance of a Thanksgiving Day
Proclamation to be devoted to prayer and thankfulness to God.57 The
justices seemed to indicate that the Lemon test is inappropriate in cases
concerning longstanding practices within the government that may have
religious origins or implications; this is evidenced by their discussion of
how opening legislative sessions with prayer and religious images in the
Supreme Court and around the nation’s capital is constitutional.58
Chief Justice Rehnquist and those in concurrence with him clarified that
there are limitations to the displays of religious messages or symbols by the
government, citing the case Stone v. Graham. 59 In Stone, the Supreme
Court held displaying the Ten Commandments in every public classroom
was unconstitutional, but the justices in Van Orden differentiated the
classroom displays from the Texas monument by explaining that the
monument was a much more passive use of the Ten Commandments. 60 The
four justices noted that the petitioner walked by the Texas monument for
years before bringing suit, and that the monument represented both Texas
political and legal history. 61 The monument served a dual purpose of
representing both religion and government, and because having religious
content does not singularly run afoul of the Establishment Clause, the
justices found the monument to be constitutional.62
Conversely, in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued to enjoin displays featuring gold55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 683.
Id. at 685-86.
Id. at 686-87.
Id. at 687-88.
Id. at 678.
Id. at 690-91.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 691-92.
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framed, large copies of the Ten Commandments in two courthouses in
different Kentucky counties. 63 The displays were modified to add eight
smaller, historical documents with religious references as the single shared
element, such as the “endowed by their Creator” passage of the Declaration
of Independence. 64 The district court issued a preliminary injunction against
the original displays, and the counties revised the displays for the third
time. 65 The third display, named “The Foundations of American Law and
Government Display,” was comprised of nine framed, equally sized
documents including the Commandments, Star Spangled Banner lyrics, and
the Declaration of Independence.66 On motion from the ACLU, the district
court included the third display in the injunction.67 The Sixth Circuit
affirmed, and the Supreme Court upheld the Sixth Circuit’s ruling. 68
Although the two counties asked the Court to disregard the purpose in
displaying the pictures, because the “official purpose is unknowable” and
any search for it would be in vain, the Supreme Court held that the purpose
of the counties in displaying the Ten Commandments in courtrooms may be
considered, and that the “development of the presentation should be
considered when determining its purpose.” 69 The Court held the second
display had an impermissible purpose because of the religious focus, and
that the third display also had an impermissible purpose because the
revision was simply for a “litigating position.”70 The Court also explained
its decision by noting that when analyzing the third display “[n]o
reasonable observer could swallow the claim that the [c]ounties had cast off
the [religious] objective so unmistakable in the earlier displays.” 71
The Court reaffirmed the “touchstone for [its] analysis is the principle
that the ‘First Amendment mandates government neutrality between
religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion,’” and the value
of the Lemon test. 72 The Court maintained that looking at purpose is
important to prevent the government from forgoing neutrality and acting
with the intention to favor a religious point of view, and emphasized that

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

545 U.S. 844, 851-52 (2005).
Id. at 844.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 845.
Id. at 850-51.
Id. at 870-72.
Id. at 872.
Id. at 860-61.
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examining purpose makes practical sense.73 The Court also stated there was
no indication that when looking at purpose the test would be fatal every
time in claims involving violations of the Establishment Clause. 74 In fact,
the Court noted the test was not fatal very often, because the government
did not usually act with the “predominant purpose of advancing religion.”75
The two counties in McCreary also argued the purpose in this case
should only be inferred “from the latest news about the last in a series of
governmental actions,” disregarding how close they may be in subject and
time. 76 The Court rejected this notion, and stated that “the world is not
made brand new every morning,” and that the counties wanted an
“absentminded objective observer,” not one who is accustomed with past
government actions and proficient in assessing what context the policy
arises from. 77 The Supreme Court held that purpose must be weighed
heavily under the Establishment Clause and considered in the light of
context. 78 The Court restated the importance of neutrality, but also made it
clear that the Court’s holding did not mean sacred text could never be used
in a governmental display without violating the Establishment Clause.79
The two very different avenues the Court took in deciding its most recent
Establishment Clause cases are a clear portrayal of the confusion and lack
of clarity in this area of the law, as well as evidence of the differing
opinions among the justices in the application of the Lemon test. The
Supreme Court has made no clear test for Establishment Clause purposes
and until it does decide to adopt a majority test, the lower courts will
continue to wade through the murky waters of this doctrine.
B. Creation of the Compelled Speech Doctrine
The Supreme Court introduced the compelled speech doctrine in 1943
when the Court held in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette
that the government could not force a student to recite the Pledge of

73. Id. at 860-62. The Court also noted that appellate courts across the country examine
purpose daily, and that “eyes that look to purposes belong to an ‘objective observer,’ one
who takes account of the traditional external signs that show up in the ‘text, legislative
history, and implementation of the statute,’ or comparable official act.” Id. at 862.
74. Id. at 863.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 866.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 874.
79. Id.
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Allegiance. 80 The school policy at issue in Barnette stated that if a student
did not comply and recite the pledge they would be expelled from the
school, and the student’s parents or guardians would be liable to
prosecution and possibly fined up to fifty dollars or jailed for thirty days. 81
In Barnette, the Court held that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their therein,” and
declared the school’s practice to be unconstitutional.82
The Court expanded its reasoning in Barnette in the 1977 case Wooley v.
Maynard, which, like Cressman, involved speech on a license plate. 83 In
Wooley, an action was brought for injunctive and declaratory relief against
the New Hampshire statutes criminalizing the obstruction of the words
“Live Free or Die” on its state license plates.84 This gave the Court an
opportunity to further develop the compelled speech doctrine.
Maynard and his wife were members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses faith,
and considered the motto “Live Free or Die” as contrary to their political,
moral, and religious beliefs, which caused the couple to cover up the saying
on their jointly owned family vehicles.85 Maynard was issued a citation and
given a twenty-five-dollar fine for committing a felony by covering up the
motto. 86 One month later, Maynard was charged with the same violation
and fined fifty dollars, and spent fifteen days in jail. 87 Before trial for his
second violation, Maynard received a third violation of the same offense
and was convicted as “continued for sentence” and received no additional
punishment to the fifteen days he spent in jail.88
The District Court held that Maynard was engaging in symbolic speech
by covering up the state motto on his license plate, and that the interest of
New Hampshire in enforcing its defacement statute was not great enough to
justify restricting Maynard’s constitutionally protected expression.89 The
Supreme Court decided not to examine the symbolic speech issue, but
80. Note, The Curious Relationship Between the Compelled Speech and Government
Speech Doctrines, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2411, 2418 (2004).
81. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626-29 (1943).
82. Id. at 642.
83. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
84. Id. at 709.
85. Id. at 707.
86. Id. at 708.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 713.
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instead considered the objection of the Maynards to displaying “Live Free
or Die” on their license plates. 90
The Court began its analysis by reaffirming its decision in Barnette, and
observed that the New Hampshire statute required the appellees to “use
their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological
message.” 91 It was unpersuasive to the Court that most citizens would agree
with New Hampshire’s motto; the First Amendment’s protection extends to
the right of citizens to have a different ideology than the majority of the
population, and the “state [cannot] constitutionally require an individual to
participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it
on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be
observed and read by the public.” 92
The Court looked at New Hampshire’s countervailing interest to see if its
interest was sufficiently compelling to warrant the requirement for the
appellees to display the motto on their license plates.93 The interests of the
state were to “(1) facilitat[e] the identification of passenger vehicles, and
(2) promot[e] appreciation of history, individualism, and state pride.”94 The
Court held that the purpose of identification could be achieved by more
narrow means. 95 When considering the second interest of the state, the
Supreme Court held that although the state may circulate state pride,
individualism, and respect for history, this interest could not outweigh an
individual’s First Amendment right to avoid portraying this message, and
affirmed the judgment of the district court. 96
The Supreme Court continued to develop the compelled speech doctrine
in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,
(GLIB). 97 In Hurley, gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of Irish
immigrants formed the respondent organization GLIB in order to march in
Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day parade, and were denied by the organization that
orchestrated the parade, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council (the
Council). 98 The Council was comprised of individuals from different South
90. Id.
91. Id. at 715.
92. Id. at 713, 715.
93. Id. at 716.
94. Id. New Hampshire also argued that because the motto was only on passenger
vehicles and not commercial or other vehicles, the motto allows police officers to more
readily identify if passenger vehicles have the requisite plates. Id.
95. Id. at 716-17.
96. Id. at 717.
97. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
98. Id. at 560-61.
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Boston veterans groups. 99 The GLIB obtained a court order to be able to
march in the parade, but was refused again the following year, and the
organization filed suit against the Council.100 The state trial court rejected
the Council’s contention that the parade was private, and found that the
Council’s refusal was in violation of the state’s public accommodations
law, and in contrast with purpose of St. Patrick’s Day, which is to celebrate
diversity. 101
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts affirmed, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.102 The Court noted while the Council presented a First
Amendment claim, the respondents did not, but the activity disputed was
within the nature of protected speech, and that it would decide
accordingly. 103 The Court discussed the form of speech parades fall under,
and held that parades are a form of expression by the “inherent
expressiveness of marching to make a point.” 104 The Court also held that
the protected expression in a parade is not limited to its songs and banners
because the Constitution “looks beyond written or spoken words as
mediums of expression.” 105 The Supreme Court held that a “speaker has the
autonomy to choose the content of his own message,” and reversed the
Massachusetts Supreme Court decision, finding the public accommodation
law application to the parade unconstitutional. 106
III. Effects of the Establishment Clause and Compelled Speech Doctrine on
State Sponsored Native American Imagery
When Keith Cressman brought his claim against various Oklahoma
public officials for being compelled to display the Sacred Rain Arrow
artwork on his vehicles’ license plates, he posed a unique issue to the court,
which had not yet been considered. Cressman’s case was ultimately decided
against him upon remand to the district court, which may discourage others
from bringing similar claims. However, close examination of his case,
including analysis of the lower court’s decision and how the Tenth Circuit
reached its decision to reinstate the case, could lead to success of future
claims.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 560.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 563, 566.
Id. at 566-67.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 573, 581.
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A. Cressman v. Thompson
Keith Cressman, a Methodist minister at St. Mark’s United Methodist
Church in Bethany, Oklahoma, believes there is “one true God,” and that it
is a sin to concede any other god. 107 In August of 2008, Cressman learned
that the Oklahoma standard vehicle license plate had been given a new
design, and the new plate would be introduced in January of 2009.108 Upon
seeing Houser’s artwork displayed on the license plate, Cressman
“discerned that [it] depicted and communicated Native American religious
beliefs in contradiction to his own Christian religious beliefs.” 109 Cressman
researched the piece of art, and learned of the inspiration behind the
sculpture. 110
From Cressman’s perspective, the piece “retells the story of a Native
American who believes in sacred objects[,] in multiple deities and in the
divinity of nature[,] and in the ability of humans to use sacred objects to
convince gods to alter nature.” 111 Cressman does not wish to display the
image on his vehicle’s license plate because he believes its message will
communicate ideas about Native American culture and practices which
contradict his sincerely-held religious beliefs; Cressman would rather
remain silent in consideration to images and messages he cannot endorse or
accept. 112 Cressman stated, “The underlying narrative of this story, and of
the license plate where the story is depicted, communicates the promotion
of pantheism, panentheism, polytheism, and/or animism and promotes those
particular Native Americans’ social and cultural practices that accept these
religious ideas.” 113
Initially, Cressman avoided the license plate featuring Sacred Rain
Arrow by purchasing a specialty license plate, which cost an additional
thirty-seven dollars, and had a thirty-five dollar renewal fee. 114 In an effort
to reduce his cost, Cressman purchased a cheaper license plate, which was
eighteen dollars more than the standard plate with a sixteen dollar and fifty
cent renewal fee. 115 After deciding he did not want to pay extra fees for a
107.
12.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1141 (10th Cir. 2013); Horton, supra note
Cressman, 719 F.3d at 1141.
Id.
Id. at 1141-42.
Id. at 1142.
Id.
Cressman v. Thompson, 871 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1183 (W.D. Okla. 2012).
Cressman, 719 F.3d at 1142.
Id.
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specialty license plate, Cressman looked into whether he could simply
cover up the picture of the artwork on his plate. 116 After visiting the Motor
Vehicle Division of the Oklahoma Tax Commission in Oklahoma City and
an officer with the Department of Public Safety, Cressman discovered that
covering up the image would violate title 47, section 1113 of the Oklahoma
Statutes, which provides: “The license plate, decal, and all letters and
numbers shall be clearly visible at all times.” 117 A violation of this section
is a misdemeanor, punishable with a fine of up to $300. 118
1. Dismissal by the Lower Court
Cressman continued to pay additional fees for specialty license plates on
two vehicles, and in March 2010, he sent letters to several different officials
in various departments, requesting a remedy for his situation.119 Cressman
received no responses for these letters, and subsequently filed a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 civil rights lawsuit against various public officials in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, alleging the violation
of his rights with consideration to the freedom of speech, due process, and
the free exercise of religion under the First and Fourteenth amendments. 120
Cressman filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
defendants from administering section 1113, and alternatively requested the
court to compel the defendants to provide specialty license plates to
Cressman at no further cost. 121
In order to determine whether Cressman’s request for a preliminary
injunction would be granted, the district court first considered whether
Cressman was substantially likely to succeed on the merits.122 The court
held that while it did not doubt the genuineness of Cressman’s religious
beliefs, he did not meet his burden of showing he had been compelled to
116. Id.
117. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 1113 (2011), quoted in Cressman, 719 F.3d at 1142-43.
118. Cressman, 719 F.3d at 1143.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Cressman v. Thompson, 871 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180-81 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (stating
that in order to be granted a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff “must show that four factors
weigh in his favor: ‘(1) [he] is substantially likely to succeed on the merits; (2) [he] will
suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied; (3) [his] threatened injury outweighs the
injury the opposing party will suffer under the injunction; and (4) the injunction would not
be adverse to the public interest.’” (quoting Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1125 (10th Cir.
2012) (quoting in turn Beltronics USA v. Midwest Inventory Distrib., 562 F.3d 1067, 1070
(10th Cir. 2009)))).
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engage in speech and to “be an instrument for fostering public adherence to
an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.”123
The court distinguished Cressman’s case from Wooley by finding that the
speech involved in Cressman’s was symbolic instead of a written or verbal
expression. 124 The court stated that for symbols or conduct to fall within the
realms of the First and Fourteenth amendments, they must be “sufficiently
imbued with elements of communication,” by showing that Oklahoma’s
“intent [through its use of the Native American image] [was] to convey a
‘particularized message’ along with a great likelihood that the message will
be understood by those viewing it.” 125
The court supported its finding that the image did not convey a
particularized message by examining the circumstances in which Cressman
discovered the meaning of the image. 126 The court held “nothing on the tag
indicates that the image is based on a sculptur[e],” and that “while
[Cressman] clearly links the image to the sculpture and legend, nothing on
the license plate, itself, makes or suggests that connection.” 127 The court
acknowledged Cressman’s independent research was the basis for his
knowledge of the image’s meaning, and held that even if a reasonable
observer knew of the image’s origin, the court would still not find the
observer likely to associate the driver of a car featuring this license plate
with the image’s religious affiliations. 128
The court also found that even if Cressman had shown other people
might interpret the license plate to be communicating a message concerning
Cressman’s religious beliefs, the court would still conclude that Cressman
had not been coerced to speak in violation of his constitutional rights
because a reasonable observer could not garner a religious meaning from
the image or impute such meaning to the driver.129 The court followed the
Supreme Court’s caution that it “cannot accept that an apparently limitless
variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in
the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.” 130 Because the objective
observer viewing the symbol would not likely understand a particularized
message from the symbol, the court held that the State of Oklahoma was
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 1181.
Id. at 1182.
Id.
Id. at 1183.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1184.
Id. at 1185.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014

518

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

not attempting to promote an ideological point of view to the public, unlike
the speech in Wooley, and dismissed Cressman’s complaint. 131
2. Reversed by the Tenth Circuit
Cressman appealed the lower court’s decision, and the Tenth Circuit
considered whether the district court erred in dismissing Cressman’s
complaint for failure to state a First Amendment compelled speech claim. 132
The Tenth Circuit (1) addressed the Supreme Court’s precedence of
symbolic speech and compelled speech claims under the First Amendment,
(2) analyzed Cressman’s complaint to assess whether it stated a plausible
compelled symbolic speech claim, and (3) addressed the defendants’
argument that the image was government speech that does not involve the
First Amendment. 133
After reviewing Wooley, Hurley, and several other Supreme Court
decisions concerning compelled speech claims, the court agreed that
Cressman was compelled to exhibit the image on his license plate “because
he must choose between (1) prosecution and criminal penalties for covering
up the image and (2) paying additional fees for specialty license plates that
do not display the image.” 134 The court also recognized that Cressman’s
claim was different than the claim in Wooley because it was based on an
image instead of written words, and considered whether the image was
symbolic speech that requires First Amendment safeguarding; after
answering affirmatively, the court considered whether Cressman’s
requirement to display the image violated his First Amendment rights under
the compelled speech doctrine.135
The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court has “long recognized
that its protection does not end at the spoken or written word.” 136 The
Supreme Court has protected expressive conduct such as wearing an
armband to express particular views and the burning of an American flag to
make a political demonstration.137 The Tenth Circuit noted the origin of the
Supreme Court’s “particularized message” language was in Spence v.
Washington, and concerned a flag hung upside down with peace symbols
attached to both sides, which was found to be conveying a particular
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1144 (10th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1147.
Id. at 1147-48.
Id. at 1148.
Id.
Id.
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message. 138 This language reappeared in Texas v. Johnson, a flag burning
case, which was also held to communicate a particular message likely to be
understood. 139
Spence and Johnson both asked whether symbolic speech was permeated
with elements of communication by considering whether there was “(1) an
intent to convey a particularized message, and (2) a great likelihood that the
message would be understood by those who viewed the symbolic act or
display.” 140 In Hurley, the Court suggested these factors are not required
prerequisites for symbolic speech; the Supreme Court stated, “a narrow,
succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional
protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a ‘particularized
message,’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of
Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of
Lewis Carroll.” 141 The Tenth Circuit did not deliberate over the effect of
Hurley on the Spence-Johnson factors, but simply recognized that these
factors may be a too high of a standard at times for First Amendment
protection.142
After reviewing the Supreme Court’s discussion of compelled and
symbolic speech, the Tenth Circuit analyzed whether Cressman pled a
plausible First Amendment compelled speech claim arising from symbolic
speech. 143 The court held that Cressman’s complaint met the more stringent
Spence-Johnson factors when accepting all the factual allegations in
Cressman’s complaint as true, which stated that observers would
understand that the plate conveys messages about Native American culture,
including their religious beliefs. 144 Cressman sufficiently showed that the
license plate image was symbolic speech, and the district court erred in
rejecting Cressman’s allegations as true.145 The Tenth Circuit next
considered whether Cressman plausibly stated a claim for compelled speech
protection. 146 Because Cressman alleged the image was ideological speech,

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 1149.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1150.
Id.
Id. at 1152.
Id. at 1153-54.
Id. at 1155.
Id.
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based on Native American religious beliefs, the Tenth Circuit ruled that his
claim should survive. 147
The Tenth Circuit also briefly considered the appellees’ argument that
the image was government speech which does not implement First
Amendment scrutiny, and that the Supreme Court had implicitly limited
Wooley. 148 The court cautioned against suggestions that the Supreme Court
had overruled or narrowed its cases, and noted that the Court had the
opportunity to do just that in later cases, but refused to do so. 149 The Tenth
Circuit held that the “relevant question is whether Mr. Cressman is ‘closely
linked with the expression in a way that makes [him] appear to endorse the
government message,” and that Wooley answered this question by finding
that license plates act as mobile billboards which adequately connect the
driver of the vehicle to the speech, which in turn raises compelled speech
issues. 150 The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court’s dismissal of
Cressman’s claim and denial for this motion to grant a preliminary
injunction, and remanded the case back to the district court. 151
Judge Paul Kelly Jr., dissented from the majority opinion, based on his
belief that the complaint did not contain adequate factual allegations to
show beyond speculation that Cressman was entitled to relief.152 Judge
Kelly discussed the context of the image, which in Oklahoma he argued
would be seen as a historical or cultural message because of the state’s
integral Native American culture.153 According to Judge Kelly, Cressman’s
allegations that the image was an ideological message were simply
unreasonable inferences, and therefore the district court’s ruling of the
complaint’s dismissal should have be affirmed. 154
3. Denied Relief Once Again by the District Court
Upon remand, the district court considered whether the image conveyed
a particularized message or whether it at least gave the appearance of some
type of religious implication or theme, and found that it did not.155 The
court’s reasoning relied heavily on Cressman having to independently
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
2014).

Id. at 1156.
Id.
Id. at 1156-57.
Id. at 1157.
Id. at 1158.
Id.
Id. at 1159.
Id.
Cressman v. Thompson, No. CIV-11-1290-HE, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 14,
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research the image to learn of its origin and associate the art with religion;
the court found this evidenced the conclusion that the ordinary person
would not facially recognize the image as having a religious message. 156
The court also justified its decision by noting that the image was not an
exact replica of Sacred Rain Arrow because the warrior in the image on the
license plate held his arrow at approximately a sixty-degree angle in
comparison to the almost vertical arrow in the original image. 157 The court
found that this slight change could deter viewers from assuming Oklahoma
was intending to emit the same message as the sculptor originally
intended. 158
The district court emphasized “the essential question is what a
reasonable observer of the image on the license plate would understand
from it.” 159 The court acknowledged that Hurley indicated the SpenceJohnson test could be too stringent in some instances, and in order to assess
what message a reasonable observer would understand from the image, the
court must look not at “whether there is a ‘great likelihood’ that a particular
message would be understood, but simply whether it is reasonably likely
that it would.” 160 In applying this standard, this district court held that a
reasonable observer would not likely understand a message being conveyed
by the image because “without further research it is simply a depiction of
an Indian shooting a bow and arrow.” 161 To support this contention, the
court referenced Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights,
Inc. 162
B. Compelled Speech Claims Brought by Affronted Citizens Protesting the
Display of Native American Artwork Could Likely Be Successful
Cressman was ultimately unsuccessful with his compelled speech claim,
but other similar cases could very likely be successful if the basis of the
claim has a more overtly religious message. The district court was reluctant
to readily accept the replica of Sacred Rain Arrow on the Oklahoma license
plate as expressing a clear religious message, but this will not deter
plaintiffs bringing other cases based on artwork that facially has religious
attributions. In the interest of balancing the state’s Native American culture
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
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and Cressman's First Amendment rights the court reached the correct
decision, but its analysis in getting there did not coincide with Supreme
Court precedent.
The district court did remedy an oversight made by the Tenth Circuit.
Although the Tenth Circuit discussed the “particularized message” and
“likelihood the message would be understood” factors for symbolic speech
from Spence and Johnson, and the suggestion from Hurley that at times
these factors are too high of a bar, it did not consider a recent Supreme
Court case which addressed this issue and could be highly probative to the
issue of Native American artwork being viewed as speech.163 The district
court in Cressman briefly referenced the case, but instead of undermining
Cressman’s argument like the court intended it to, this case could positively
impact other compelled speech cases concerning Native American imagery.
In 2006, the Supreme Court decided Rumsfeld, which considered
whether the Solomon Amendment, which at the time precluded the
Department of Defense from issuing federal funds to any institution of
higher education that effectively prevented military recruiters from entering
their campuses, violated law schools’ First Amendment rights of speech
and association. 164 The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.,
(FAIR) is an association of law schools and faculties who promote full
academic freedom and oppose discrimination, including discrimination to
others based on sexual orientation. 165 In furtherance of this policy, FAIR
members wanted to restrict military recruiting on their campuses because of
the policy adopted by Congress regarding homosexuals in the military;
however, because their funding would be withheld, the schools were forced
to choose between their nondiscrimination position and receiving federal
funding. 166
FAIR sought a preliminary injunction against the Solomon Amendment,
and was denied by the district court, who found that forcing upon the
schools “an unwanted periodic visitor” did not “significantly affect the law
schools’ ability to express their particular message or viewpoint.” 167 The
Third Circuit held the Solomon Amendment infringed upon the schools’
constitutional rights based on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
because the schools were torn between receiving federal funding and
163.
164.
(2006).
165.
166.
167.

Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1153-54 (10th Cir. 2013).
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52-53
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id. at 53.
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asserting their First Amendment rights. 168 The case was reversed and
remanded for the lower court to enter a preliminary injunction against
enforcing the Solomon Amendment, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 169
The Supreme Court discussed the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
and held that the Solomon Amendment would violate this doctrine if
Congress could not otherwise require these schools to give equal access to
their students to military recruiters when compared to other employers. 170
The Court noted that the Solomon Amendment regulated the conduct of the
schools, not their speech, but then considered the reasoning by the Third
Circuit that (1) in supplying the military recruiters’ services the law schools
were being compelled to speak, (2) military recruiters were speaking while
on campus, and (3) if the statute regulated conduct, the conduct was
expressive and regulating would infringe on the law schools’ First
Amendment rights. 171
The Court rejected the Third Circuit’s ruling that the Solomon
Amendment impermissibly controlled speech, but then considered whether
the expressiveness of the conduct controlled by the statute fell within the
protection of the First Amendment. 172 In analyzing this issue, the Court
referred to Johnson but instead of using the “particularized message”
language the Court stated, “we have extended First Amendment protection
only to conduct that is inherently expressive.” 173 The Court looked at the
conduct the law schools claimed expressed disagreement with the military
(military recruiters interviewing away from the law schools) and reasoned
that this conduct could be explained for a variety of reasons, such as, there
was no space to interview at the law schools, or that independently the
recruiters decided to interview somewhere else.174 The Court held that the
“expressive component of a law school’s actions is not created by the
conduct itself but by the speech that accompanies it,” and reversed the
Third Circuit’s decision. 175
This decision did not expressly render the factors in Spence and Johnson
invalid, but rather expanded them. The district court analogized this case to
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 54.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id. at 66, 70.
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Cressman, and found that because the message Cressman opposed required
research, it too fell short of First Amendment protection. This is an
erroneous application of Rumsfeld because of the extreme factual
differences in the cases and because it does not take into consideration
former Supreme Court case Hurley that easily answers this question. In
Rumsfeld, the conduct being questioned was the absence of military
recruiters at a law school, compared to the artwork in Cressman’s case. The
issue in Rumsfeld was whether a message was being communicated at all,
while in Cressman’s case there was clearly a message, though perhaps
interpreted varyingly by different viewers.
The Supreme Court in Hurley explicitly stated the requirement of a
particularized message to be too high of a bar in some instances because it
would not protect the “painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold
Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.” 176 This seems to
indicate that the Supreme Court views artwork as inherently expressive. 177
Plaintiffs in future cases opposing Native American artwork could use
Rumsfeld and Hurley to show that art is expressive and that in considering
all of these factors, the artwork should clearly be seen as speech, and
implicate First Amendment concerns.
In its compelled speech precedent, the Supreme Court has not addressed
the issue of whose viewpoint courts should use when assessing speech that
does not have an explicit message like “Live Free or Die” as in Wooley.
The district court adopted a reasonable observer standard, which seems to
coincide with previous Supreme Court rulings, including Rumsfeld. The
language used in Rumsfeld is “inherently expressive,” and for something to
be considered inherent it must “belon[g] to the basic nature of someone or
something.” 178 To know the “basic nature” of something, it is logical to
look at how the ordinary person would categorize an object, so this seems
consistent with using a reasonable observer standard in interpreting the
artwork’s message or lack thereof. This standard does not conflict with
former Supreme Court cases, and can be a workable measure in conjunction
with “inherently expressive” when dealing with abstract content such as
artwork. The Spence-Johnson factors in Cressman’s case were ultimately
unsuccessful because of the ambiguity surrounding the artwork and its
disputed message. Because “Live Free or Die” was actually written out on
176. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995).
177. Id. at 568.
178. Inherent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dicti
onary/inherent (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
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the license plate in Wooley, it was easy to establish that the plate was
conveying an ideological message, and although the message could be
interpreted as historical or cultural based on the origin of New Hampshire,
overall the statement would be seen as promoting an ideology. The
Oklahoma license plate is much more difficult to analyze because it does
not explicitly state an ideological message. As the lower court correctly
found, the first impression of the image is simply a warrior shooting an
arrow; it does not immediately raise questions about its religious origins.
Even though the district court did not find a violation of Cressman’s First
Amendment rights, this case will draw the attention of potential plaintiffs
objecting to states’ use of Native American imagery, and by looking at the
lower court’s decision, will enable future plaintiffs to present much stronger
cases. Although the religious message in Cressman was not explicit enough
to create a compelled speech violation, other uses of Native American
imagery could be interpreted by the courts as having a strong enough
religious message to prompt First Amendment protection.
C. Establishment Clause Claims Brought for States’ Use of Native
American Artwork Will Likely Be Unsuccessful
Although not brought as an avenue for recovery by Cressman, within
appellees’ brief to the Tenth Circuit lies discussion of why an
Establishment Clause claim made by Cressman would be unsuccessful. Any
state involvement with religion brings with it Establishment Clause
concerns, and with the religious aspects of Native American artwork and
the frequency that such artwork is used, this is likely another area of the law
which could see a rise in cases brought protesting Native American
imagery.
Appellees described Cressman’s argument that an image need not be
particularized or ideological for First Amendment compelled speech
protection as unusual, and a facade for hiding Cressman’s real objection to
the artwork, which according to appellees is based on a violation of the
Establishment Clause. 179 Appellees contended that an Establishment Clause
claim based on the Sacred Rain Arrow image would be unsuccessful,
relying heavily on the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Weinbaum v. City of Las
Cruses. 180

179. Appellees’ Joint Response Brief at 17-18, Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139
(10th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-6151).
180. Id. at 18; see Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruses, 541 F.3d 1017 (10th Cir. 2008).
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In Weinbaum, the Tenth Circuit considered whether the display of three
crosses on the city of Las Cruces’ official seal placed on various public
properties violated the Establishment Clause.181 The court held that when
considering whether artwork violates the Establishment Clause, “the artist’s
inspiration or intent is irrelevant,” and when applying the Lemon test, the
crosses did not cause a violation because the name Las Cruces literally
means crosses. 182 The appellees argue that the same reasoning could be
used in Cressman’s case. 183
Appellees contend that under Establishment Clause analysis, a court will
look at the government’s intent in speaking, and under Free Exercise and
Free Speech analysis, a court would look at the person’s intent in wanting
to speak, which is why Cressman chose to only bring a compelled speech
claim. 184 In Cressman’s case, the Legislative Task Force chose Sacred Rain
Arrow for tourism reasons and to publicize Oklahoma as “Native-America,”
which is vastly different than Cressman’s subjective belief of the religious
implications of the image. 185
Appellees are correct in asserting that a court will look at the purpose of
the government in Establishment Clause cases, but are erroneous in
assuming that simply because the government did not have the intent to
promote religion in Cressman’s case it avoided violating the Establishment
Clause; this type of analysis is vastly contradictory to the endorsement test.
In McCreary County, the Supreme Court discussed the role of intent in
these types of cases, and acknowledged that purpose was important but
should not be the sole focus of the parties involved because the government
rarely acts with the express purpose of promoting religion. If there is
evidence of the government acting with an illegitimate purpose, a court’s
analysis could end there, such as in McCreary. However, in cases where
there is not a showing of the government acting with a forbidden motive, a
court’s analysis will go beyond the government’s purpose when deciding
whether there has been a violation of the Establishment Clause and look at
the effect of the government’s action.
In Cressman’s case, the government has clearly provided the image on
the license plate because the plates are issued by the state. Under the Lemon
test, the license plate would most likely not be a violation of the
Establishment Clause because the government did not have an improper
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
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Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
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purpose in placing the image on the license plates; however, it could be
argued that the artwork could be seen as having the effect of advancing the
Native American religion and therefore fails the endorsement test.
Challengers to these types of images on state paraphernalia would argue
that by choosing Native American artwork with religious connotations,
Oklahoma is essentially promoting or endorsing one religion to the
detriment of other religions or non-religion, which would have the effect of
making viewers feel like second-class citizens.
The state would counter this argument by urging the court to also look at
the context of the government action and decide from the viewpoint of a
reasonable observer whether or not the images have the effect of endorsing
religion. In Cressman’s case, Oklahoma has always used Native American
images in its official state items for historical and cultural reasons, and
since the reasonable observer has a reasonable memory, they would be well
aware of this fact and probably assume Sacred Rain Arrow was displayed
on the license plates to represent Oklahoma’s strong Native American
culture. Similarly, the reasonable observer may not have knowledge of the
origins of Sacred Rain Arrow, and will probably not associate the image
with any type of religion.
State officials could also argue that since Native American culture is tied
so closely with religion, if the court were to find that the Sacred Rain
Arrow artwork violated the Establishment Clause, it would effectively put
into question all Native American images used by the state which should be
protected as a long standing tradition of the states. This argument has
persuaded the Court before in cases like Van Orden, but it has also failed in
other cases, such as Lee v. Weisman. 186
The challenged practice before the Court in Lee was the delivering of
prayers by members of the clergy during graduation ceremonies for public
middle schools and high schools in Providence, Rhode Island. 187 During the
specific middle school graduation ceremony analyzed by the Court, a rabbi
was invited to deliver the prayers.188 The rabbi was given a guide to
administering the prayers, which suggested the prayers be drafted with
“inclusiveness and sensitivity.” 189 The principal of the middle school also
recommended to the rabbi that the prayers be nonsectarian.190

186.
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188.
189.
190.
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The family protesting the prayer sought a permanent injunction against
the Providence public school system to bar it from inviting clergy in the
future to deliver prayers at invocation ceremonies, and the district court
granted the injunction.191 The district court came to its conclusion by
applying the Lemon test, and finding that the school system failed the
second prong of the test because the prayers gave the appearance or had the
effect of advancing religion. 192 The First Circuit affirmed on appeal, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 193
In its analysis, the Court first looked at the involvement of the school in
the prayers. The Court explained that the issue was not whether the school
made an effort for the prayer to be acceptable to most people, but rather the
legitimacy of the school involving itself with the administration of the
prayer when it was to be used “in a formal religious exercise which
students, for all practical purposes, are obliged to attend.” 194 The Supreme
Court found that the involvement of the school resulted in the “imprint of
the State” on the prayers; the Court then examined the position the prayers
placed students in. 195 The Court recognized that there was high public and
peer pressure on students to stand or be respectful during the prayers, and
that this pressure was as compelling as requiring the students to
participate. 196 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that placing middle and
high school students in this position was inconsistent with the
Establishment Clause, and affirmed the First Circuit’s ruling. 197
Even though in Lee the Court found the time-honored practice of prayers
at public middle and high school graduations unconstitutional, in the case of
Native American imagery the Court is more likely to analogize to Van
Orden. The Native American symbols are even more passive than the Texas
monument in Van Orden because they are not overtly religious or as widely
recognized as the Ten Commandments, and are vastly different than school
prayer because the symbols do not result in peer or public pressure on
citizens to conform with a religious exercise. Similar to the Ten
Commandments, which have been used in various governmental property,
these types of Native American images have been used for hundreds of
years by many states, not just Oklahoma.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 584.
Id. at 584-85.
Id. at 585-86.
Id. at 588-89.
Id. at 590.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 593, 599.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol38/iss2/4

No. 2]

COMMENT

529

The Supreme Court would probably not find the Sacred Rain Arrow
artwork used on the Oklahoma license plate an infringement of the
Establishment Clause because the government’s motive in selecting the
image was for tourism reasons and for furthering the view of Oklahoma as
“Native-America”; the image does not have the effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion because of the subtlety of the religious connotations. The
reasonable observer would not view the images as government endorsement
or disapproval of religion because they have a reasonable memory of our
nation’s history in using these depictions in various official paraphernalia.
However, this does not mean that all Native American artwork used by
states would pass constitutional muster under the Establishment Clause. If
states were to use Native American images in their official memorabilia
that had overt religious attributes, especially qualities that would easily be
recognized by the public as religious, these depictions would be a violation
of the Establishment Clause if citizens felt like those religious qualities
were being promoted over their own religion or lack of religion. States can
avoid Establishment Clause problems with respect to using Native
American imagery by acting with a secular purpose; Establishment Clause
violations could also be minimized by the states use of artwork that would
be viewed overall as contributing to the recognition of the Native American
culture and history of the state instead of using images that would primarily
have the effect of advancing or endorsing religion. By carefully selecting
the Native American depictions used, states should be able to avoid
stepping outside the boundaries of the Establishment Clause; the more
concerning issue for the courts will be compelled speech claims.
IV. Balancing the Native American Culture of the States While Protecting
the First Amendment Rights of the Citizens
The district court reached the right decision in Cressman’s case by
finding that the image did not violate his First Amendment rights. The use
of Native American images by the states honors their Native American
heritage; if these depictions are not used by the states, how will their
citizens be reminded of the important role Native Americans have played in
developing the United States? Today about only 0.7 percent of the
American population, or less than two million people, are enrolled in
Native American tribes. 198 Because Native Americans comprise such a

198. Brian Palmer, How Many People Are At Least 1/32 Native American?, SLATE (May
25, 2012, 5:51 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2012/05/
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small percentage of the population, taking away tributes by the states to the
Native American people would further diminish the recognition of the
importance of Native American culture.
A. The Important Role Native Americans Have Played in Contributing to
Past and Present American Culture
The Native American people have had a lasting impact on American
culture, whether the average citizen realizes it or not. Native Americans
first grew many foods Americans eat today, including potatoes, beans, corn,
peanuts, pumpkins, tomatoes, squash, peppers, nuts, melons and sunflower
seeds. 199 Native Americans even taught European settlers how to
successfully farm these crops. 200 Over 2,000 Native American words have
influenced or developed words in the English language, such as barbecue,
caribou, hammock, mahogany, and hurricane. 201 During World War II, the
Marines used the Navajo language as a code because of its tonal qualities
that make it extremely difficult to decipher, and although the Japanese were
able to understand codes used by the U.S. Army and Army Air Corps, they
never understood the Navajo code talkers for the Marines. 202 These Navajo
code talkers served in all six Marine divisions, and participated in every
assault orchestrated by the Marines in the Pacific from 1942 to 1945;
because of the code’s success, it was not declassified until 1968. 203
Many state names are also derived from Native American words:
Connecticut is a derivative of the Native American word “Quinnehtuqut”
which means beside the long tidal river. 204 Michigan means “great water”
and is derived from the Native American word “Michigamea,” and
elizabeth_warren_says_she_s_1_32nd_native_american_how_many_people_have_that_herit
age_.html.
199. Native American Contributions, http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCU
MENTS/nrcs141p2_024206.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
200. How Has America Been Influenced by Native American Culture?, WISE GEEK,
http://www.wisegeek.org/how-has-america-been-influenced-by-native-american-culture.htm
(last visited Jan. 2, 2014); Native American Contributions, UTE TRIBE EDUC. DEP’T,
http://www. uteed.net/ulgr/aic2.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2014).
201. How Has America Been Influenced by Native American Culture?, supra note 198;
Native American Contributions, supra note 198.
202. Navajo Code Talkers: World War II Fact Sheet, NAVAL HISTORY & HERITAGE
COMMAND, http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq61-2.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2014).
203. Id.; Gerry J. Gilmore, World War II Navajo Code Talkers Visit Pentagon, Meet with
Pace, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Aug. 10, 2007), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.
aspx?ID=47020.
204. Connecticut State Name Origin, STATE SYMBOLS USA, http://www.statesymbols
usa.org/Connecticut/name_ origin_CT (last visited Jan. 2, 2014).
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Oklahoma is a Choctaw word meaning “red people.” 205 Altogether more
than half of the states’ names, twenty-six, have some type of Native
American origin. 206 The United States even adopted the same symbol as the
Iroquois Nation, the bald eagle. 207 All of these examples of Native
American influences exemplify how the history of the United States would
be vastly different without the impact of the Native American people.
B. Native American Images Used to Convey the Overall Historical and
Cultural Influences of the Native American People Should Not Be
Considered a Violation of the Citizens’ First Amendment Rights
States are honoring the great influence Native American culture has had
in shaping American history and culture by displaying these images; by
establishing Oklahoma as “Native-America,” the state is showing pride in
its history and respect to the Native American people. These are values that
will be compromised by claims against imagery such as Sacred Rain
Arrow, and the courts should be careful in their rulings. It must be
recognized that not all Native American images have explicitly religious
meanings; although Native Americans are a religious people, in most
instances these types of pieces have much greater historical and cultural
weight than religious.
As long as the predominant message of such artwork is not religious, the
government should not be in danger of violating the Establishment Clause
or compelled speech doctrine. The states’ purposes are not to promote or
endorse the Native American religion, but rather to honor the states’ past
and to remember the contributions made by the Native Americans. If the
states’ intentions are not to endorse one religion over another, and if no one
is made to feel like a second-class citizen because of the images, the states
will be safely within the limits of the Establishment Clause. States should
be able to continue using Native American artwork on government property
without violating the Establishment Clause; by maintaining a secular
purpose in using these images that do not have primarily religious
messages, the states can create a harmony between the First Amendment
concerns and Native American depictions.
Similarly, with compelled speech cases the courts should look at whether
the prevalent message of the artwork is ideological, or if the artwork is
merely expressing the overall culture of the Native Americans. In
205. Native American Contributions, supra note 198.
206. Native American State Names, NATIVE-LANGUAGES, http://www.native-languages.
org/state-names.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2014).
207. How Has America Been Influenced by Native American Culture?, supra note 198.
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Cressman’s case, although the story behind the image does have some
religious meaning, the image was used on the Oklahoma license plate
because it was thought to be a representation of the state and its Native
American influences. The state was probably aware of the inspiration for
the artist who created Sacred Rain Arrow, but recognized that its overall
message was promoting Native American culture. Upon first examination
of the sculpture, there is nothing that seems to indicate that it has religious
meaning, unless it is to be assumed that all Native American artwork has
religious connotations.
In the other compelled speech cases set out above, the messages being
protested against were explicitly against the claimants’ beliefs. In Hurley,
the responding organization was created primarily out of spite against the
petitioner, and applied to march in the petitioner’s parade. The respondents
were hoping for the petitioner to be forced to allow the organization in
whose messages it did not believe into the parade to express those views to
the public, which would associate the petitioner with the message. In
Wooley, the message opposed by the Maynards was explicitly written,
“Live Free or Die,” on their license plate. These two cases are acutely
different than Cressman because there was such a clear message being
emitted in both. In Cressman’s case, and in others concerning the use by
states of Native American images with religious connotations, the courts
should find that there is no recovery under the compelled speech doctrine
because of the overpowering cultural and historical significance of these
images.
Conclusion
The Native American influences in the culture and history of the United
States are something to be proud of and represented to the public like so
many states do today. Although states have to be careful not to infringe on
any First Amendment constitutional protections, the states should be
allowed to continue to use these images and to honor the Native American
people. By acting with only the purpose to show pride in their rich tribal
heritage, and by using images that do not have overt religious meanings, the
states should be able to balance the constitutional interests of their citizens
while respecting all that the Native Americans have done for the United
States. These images preserve our Nation’s history, and will serve as a
reminder of the importance of Native American culture for generations to
come.
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